This study is a contribution to the discussion about restructuring the manufacturing industry of the Czech Republic during the period 1991-1993. The analysis is based on a unique data set created from a survey carried out in February 1994.
Introduction
The transition of the Czech economy from a command to a market economy should necessarily be accompanied by a mass restructuring of firms, which must occur at both the sectoral and enterprise levels. At the sectoral or industry level, market structures are expected to become less concentrated as competitive pressures increase. Other features of such restructuring are faster development and a deeper restructuring of labor-intensive manufacturing industries including textiles, leather, glass, china and light machinery, in which the Czech Republic traditionally has a comparative advantage, and which were suppressed under the command economy. On the contrary, the development of heavy machinery, heavy chemicals, fuel and energy industries was emphasized.
At the enterprise level, restructuring should affect management, the organizational structures, the investment in new capacities and technologies, as well as the training of employees, which lead to an increase in productivity and product quality.
There exists no explicit policy for restructuring in the Czech Republic. Changes in ownership structure together with the increase of the competitive pressure are expected to evoke changes in industry and in the internal structure of enterprises and to ensure an effective allocation of investment. How this attitude of the government towards restructuring and the above mentioned anticipations be proven? The general statistics do not provide detailed information on what is going on inside the firms. Hence, a special survey of the manufacturing firms is the only way of collecting data which would shed more light on the restructuring process.
The definitions of restructuring differ significantly from one another. The closest definition to our point of view is: "To restructure the organization means to change the way it is organized so that it has a different structure, usually in order to make it work more effectively" (English Language Dictionary, Harper Collins Publishers, London 1993).
Although the words "to restructure" are very often used in economic literature as well as in newspapers, we have not really found an exact definition. Most authors use it for personal changes in management, break-up or merging of firms, changes in the internal organization structure, changes in the firm's attitude towards R&D, marketing or advertisement, or exclusively for financial restructuring. Since the definition is vague, restructuring is not measurable.
However, we wanted to find some measure at least of relative achievements in restructuring to be able to compare firms. An indirect way of measuring restructuring is presented in Green and Price (1993) . They believe in the efficiency of capital markets. Restructuring in their sense, is any activity of the firm leading to a significant growth of the market value of the firm, therefore directly observable on the stock market.
Despite the general problems with the efficiency of capital markets, we criticize their approach from a the different point of view. Restructuring increases the uncertainty of the firm's future development. It can lead to better perspectives as well as to a situation in which the costs of restructuring cannot be covered by improvements in the firm's position. Risk aversion exists even in efficient markets, and this could lead to an initial decrease in the market value of a firm once restructuring starts.
Since the capital market in the Czech Republic has only recently been established, it is very volatile and thus not efficient. Additionally, the impossibility of applying Green and Price's approach is caused by the fact that only firms privatized in the first wave of voucher privatization are tradable on the stock market.
The main objective of this paper is to investigate the relationships between restructuring and the different ownership (property rights) structures. We also investigated whether restructuring depends on the size of enterprises or on the sector. In addition we try to testify whether there is any relationship between the restructuring efforts and firms privatized by different methods of privatization, hence whether the method of privatization can influence the restructuring of the firm.
In the second chapter, we describe the questionnaire, data collection and their main characteristics compared to the total population. We also present the methods and tools for the analysis of the data gathered in the survey and define average distribution of ownership in the firm. In chapter three we provide the basic results of the analysis, we compare the performance of state-owned with privately owned firms and construct the complex variables for restructuring, first in the unweighted and later in the weighted form.
In the first part of this core chapter three, we investigate the influence of the firm's size, its sector and its dominant owner on the internal changes in firms between 1991-1993. This first part of the analysis is based on a LOGIT model structure. The second part of chapter three utilizes advanced descriptive methods: cluster and factor analyses. This approach enables us to compare standard and non-standard methods of privatization and to relate them to restructuring efforts by extracting the strongest relationships hidden in the data.
In our survey we measured the restructuring of enterprises through various indicators separately, but in the last part of the third chapter, we construct complex variables for restructuring. First, we use the unweighted approach, then we weight the contribution of individual characteristics to our measure of restructuring. Subsequently, both measures are tested for the dependence on ownership, size and sector (industry). The main conclusions of the work are summarized in chapter four of this paper.
The Analytical Framework and Research Methodology
We prepared the questionnaire with the aim of collecting data for evaluating the firms' performance and restructuring process during the period 1991-1995. In this part of the work, we built on the experience with research work done on smaller scale before.
1 The final version of the questionnaire is presented in Appendix 1. The questionnaire has three parts and contains 29 questions, each with several answer options, altogether providing about 150 variables.
The first part of the questionnaire asks questions about the restructuring efforts during the period of 1991-1993 in the following areas:
-change of management; -break-up or merge of enterprise; -changes in internal organization (improvement of marketing, creation of a distribution network etc.); -changes in quality control; -changes in the training activities; -changes in the production program (share of the innovative, new and existing products).
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Questions about the market share and changes in competition on the market as well as changes in export and biggest problems to be tackled during the same period are also included in this first part.
The second part of the questionnaire deals with the privatization process and the firm's past performance during the period 1991-1993 (profits, investment, sales, debts, employees etc.) . The third part of the questionnaire focuses on future developments, investment and the main barriers to restructuring.
Although the survey collects the basic "hard" data, particular emphasis is placed on the "soft" data, i.e. the ideas, feelings and judgements of managers. The respondents were given the opportunity to answer anonymously. In addition, a sociologist and psychologist were consulted in designing the questionnaire with the aim of revealing the required information.
Next, we screened the entire population of enterprises for the selection of the sample. From the register of the Czech Statistical Office, we received the addresses and a short description of the total population of manufacturing firms.
There existed 3110 firms with more than 25 employees operating in manufacturing in January 1994. Out of the 3110 firms we selected randomly 1036 firms (every third firm from the list, sorted according to the alphabet), to which we mailed the questionnaire with a cover letter in February 1994. We received the answers in March 1994. During that time, all firms had the opportunity to record the results for 1993.
The response rate was unexpectedly high -about one quarter. We succeeded in collecting 257 valid questionnaires from the manufacturing firms. This number is a statistically representative sample for the total population. Nevertheless, for particular questions, the number of valid answers varies and might be substantially lower.
We spent considerable time checking for possible mistakes and irregularities in the answers and for typing errors made in entering the data into computers. We allowed for missing answers, therefore all "strange" and wrong answers were counted as missing. However, the number of valid answers never fell below 157 for any particular question. Table 1 presents the structure of the total population (i.e. all manufacturing enterprises with more than 25 employees registered by the Czech Statistical Office in January 1994) by legal form of the firm and by region, compared to the structure of our sample. The most frequent legal forms are joint stock companies and limited liability companies. As for the number of companies, about one fifth of the firms are state-owned. The manufacturing industry is not equally allocated across the eight regions into which the Czech Republic is administratively divided. Nevertheless, our sample corresponds well to the true regional distribution. If we assume that unknown firms are mainly state-owned and Limited liability companies; then the distribution according to the legal form represents the population very well, too. For the purpose of the analysis, we aggregated the enterprises according to three criteria: the size, sector (industry) and ownership. Tables 2-4 show below how representative the sample is in comparison with the whole population, according to these criteria. The size distribution, as well as the distribution of the enterprises across sectors in the sample is similar to the whole population, as shown in Tables 2 and 3 .
General Characteristics of the Sample and Total Population
The distribution of the population and the sample according to ownership form are compared in Table 4 . Ownership forms in Table 4 are defined by the Czech Statistical Office (CSO). The importance of the state sector would be different if indicators as assets, output or number of employees, respectively were used.
We can conclude that the sample of 257 enterprises is a good representation of the whole population. The only bias which could have appeared concerns the bankruptcy expectations of enterprises which answered our questionnaire. We did not receive any response from companies which expected to go bankrupt.
Methods of Analysis
Several analytical methods have been applied. For analysing the relationship between ownership and the dependent variables (i.e. given in answers to our questionnaire), sectoral and size 4 variables must be considered to be mutually independent. Tests for the influence of firm's ownership (dominant owner), size and sector to each particular characteristic were based on the logit model structure.
We have to consider the sectoral dummies and the size dummies. Only if all three sets of variables (ownership, sector and size) are used, can we explain whether the changes in the enterprises arise simply due to changes across (within) the sectors or to enterprise size, or if they are induced by different ownership structures. The correlations between the explanatory variables (i.e. ownership, size and sector) were found to be low enough for proceeding with the regression analysis.
The majority of questions in our survey require answers in the form of Yes/No or 1/0. To test the hypotheses of the impact of ownership on different indexes and to see the extent of this impact, a logit model was used. The functional form of the logit model is Prob[Y=0] = 1/(1 + exp(b 0 + b 1 X 1 +b 2 X 2 + ... + b n X n )), which makes the probability that Y is equal to 0 dependent on the observed variables, in our case ownership, the sectoral dummy, and the number of employees, which was the indicator of size in this part of the analysis.
The task (for TSP) is to find the best values for coefficients b 1 , b 2 and so on (by maximizing the likelihood function). When the coefficient of a particular variable is positive, then higher values of that variable correspond to a lower probability that Y = 0 (or to a higher probability that Y = 1).
The coefficients, the standard errors and the t-statistics have a similar interpretation to those from OLS, but the magnitude of the coefficients has a different meaning. It must reflect the functional specification used. We do not present all the regressions here.
Advanced descriptive methods, such as cluster and factor analyses, were used to reveal the main relationships hidden in the data. The complication we face is the large number of variables (the total number of individual options for our 29 questions exceeds 150). Thus, standard methods like correlation and regression analysis cannot be applied for this purpose. However, there are statistical methods available for handling a large number of variables.
The method of principal components (factor analysis) extracts a chosen number of factors from a bundle of variables. Factors can be considered as artificially created variables, each of which captures the effects of several initial variables. The crucial condition for the possibility of drawing any conclusion on the basis of factor analysis is the intuitive interpretability of artificially merged variables. If extraction is followed by successful rotation, it is possible to interpret the factors and to use them later as variables with clear meanings. This is the way of reducing the number of variables without losing most of the information contained in the initial data.
The other advantage of factors is their orthogonality. In other words, there is no dependence between one factor and any other factor formed on the basis of the same variables. Once a factor is well interpreted, it keeps its meaning in subsequent analyses. However, factor analysis does not provide sufficient indicators for the appropriate number of factors to be extracted. Thus, we determine a number of factors through an alternative method for handling many variables -cluster analysis.
Cluster analysis is a sequential process. Every step consists in finding the two variables which are most heavily correlated and merging them into one new variable -cluster. There are two different ways of utilizing clusters. First, they can be used either for selecting the representative variables for particular groups of variables merged into clusters. Alternatively, we can utilize the fact that this technique does not only merge variables, but it also orders them. The ordering is based on their similarity, so that the first one is the most similar to the second one and most different from the last one in the ordered sequence. Therefore we see which explanatory variables are close to each other (more correlated) or further away (less correlated).
13
The use of the representative variables indicated by cluster analysis leads to a higher loss of information than when applying factors. Thus, we run the cluster analysis only to obtain a hint for the determination of the appropriate number of factors. We rely on the information expressed by the rescaled distance of clusters reported in dendrograms. The rescaled distance shows how much information is relatively lost in each step of merging two clusters. The longer is the horizontal line in the dendrogram, the higher is the loss of information in the point where the line ends (where the particular cluster is combined with the other).
If there is a relatively long interval on the rescaled distance in which no mergers are reported, the number of horizontal lines in that interval corresponds to the appropriate number of representative variables to be selected (consequently, the number of factors to be extracted). On the contrary, in the interval where mergers occur (short horizontal lines), only a small loss of information occurs by using a lower number of representative variables.
We started by dividing the answers into 6 groups, which we analyzed separately:
* answers about the firm's past internal development: changes in the organizational structure, the organization of production, training activities and quality control; changes in management; innovation of products; sources of financing of investment and the use of investment. * answers about the competitiveness of the firm's environment: changes in the market share changes in competition faced by firms; main competitors. * answers about the firm's main barriers:
We asked firms separately about their main past barriers and about barriers they expect in the future, but they mostly indicated the same barriers for the past as for the future. Therefore we used only one set of answers in the analysis -main past barriers. * answers about privatization and ownership structure:
the proportion of various types of owners in the firm's capital stock; the proportion of various privatization methods applied to the firm. * answers about economic indicators of past development:
sales, change in sales; wages, change in wages; % of output exported, change in % of output exported; relative employment, change in employment; 14 relative number of workers, change in number of workers; relative stocks, change in stocks; relative credits, change in credits; relative equity, change in equity; relative profits, change in profits.
We dispose with firms' data on employment, sales, profits, credits, and so forth, separately for 1993 and 1991. In order to be able to compare small with large firms, we constructed relative indicators: 5 * answers about expectations for the future: a general characterization of the firm's future; changes in employment, sales and investment; use of investment; market orientation.
We applied both cluster and factor analyses to the above six groups. The cluster analysis showed what the most related answers are and what the appropriate number of representative variables which capture well the majority of the effects of the whole group is. On the basis of the knowledge of the appropriate number of representative variables, we extracted the factors. Then we tried to interpret these factors.
Our approach can be illustrated with the help of the answers about the competitiveness of firm's environment by the dendrogram in Appendix 2 ( Figure  A1 ). We apply a similar procedure to answers concerning the privatization methods and the ownership structure (see the dendrogram in Appendix 2 ( Figure  A2 ).
The Ownership Distribution of Firms
For the purpose of analysis and its effects on restructuring we defined the dominant owner as the owner or group of owners which owns more than 50% of assets. If no major owner in the above sense exists, the dummy "OTHER" is activated. We identified eight groups of major (dominant) owners: state (STATE), 6 investment privatization funds (IPF), managers (MANAG), foreign owners (FORIN), domestic owners (DOMIN), employees (EMPL), individual investors in the coupon privatization (DIK) 7 and others (OTHER). 8 As a result of the analysis of answers to question 15 we got the following distribution of ownership in a firm: As we can see from Table 5 , on average the share of assets owned by the state is still rather high -more than one quarter. The share owned by managers indicates that they succeeded in becoming one of the most important ownership groups. 
Selected Results of the Analysis
Analyzing the basic distributional statistics of sample answers, we found several interesting results: 70% of the firms replaced the majority of managers in the last three years. Out of the surveyed firms 55% were created through the 6 includes also the property owned by the National Property Fund (NPF) 7 see for instance Charap-Zemplinerova (1993) for the description of the coupon privatisation 8 see Lastovicka, Marcincin and Mejstrik 1994 for more details on this definition. 9 see Charap-Zemplinerova (1994) division of a former bigger firm, and 50% changed their internal organization structure. One third of enterprises applied a completely new approach to quality control, and more than one half made a serious improvement of the quality control. About forty percent of the sampled firms intensified their training activities. The rest of the enterprises made only small or no changes, or even reduced, the training activities. On average only 50% of the products are the same as three years ago. Nevertheless it is interesting to learn how the pattern of change varies according to the structure of property rights, method of privatization, size and sector. Results given in the chapters 3.1.-3.6. are based on the Logit analysis.
Change in Management
With respect to management restructuring, the changes have not been directed from above. After the 1989 revolution, there was opposition to the old management from both inside the enterprise and from the public at large, and employees, through the workers' council, had the right to participate in appointing the management. Later, a law prohibiting secret police agents from retaining high positions in the state and public sector led to changes in top management in several state enterprises. The negative answers to the total replacement of managers were associated with enterprises owned by employees (at a 0.13 significance level), as well as with those owned by the state, managers, foreign owners and investment funds. It is interesting that total replacement of managers was more likely in larger enterprises.
A partial replacement of managers is typical for enterprises in textile and clothing, means of transport and especially in those firms owned by domestic and foreign owners, the state and investment funds. Small changes in management took place in enterprises owned by employees (at a 0.14 significance level), and in the rubber and plastic material industries. No replacement of managers is reported mainly by enterprises owned by managers, some of the foreign-owned firms (at a 0.20 significance level) and by those in food and beverages. About one quarter of all enterprises disclosed small changes in management, and 7.5% enterprises reported no replacement.
Change in Organization Structure
The majority of enterprises report significant changes in their production organization, but only 67 of them report small changes and 5 of them no changes.
Large enterprises made significant changes in their organization structure, except for enterprises in the rubber and plastic products industries, and aggregates and ceramics ones. Enterprises owned by foreign owners did not report the small changes as an answer. State enterprises did not make changes in organization structure, neither did employees. 
Change in Quality Control
Enterprises in the chemical and fiber industries as well as those controlled by a foreign owner mostly opted for a completely new approach to quality control. On the contrary, enterprises owned by employees, the state and managers tended to answer negatively to this possibility. A dramatic change in quality control was reported by enterprises in aggregates and ceramics, and those controlled by the state or managers. 
Change in Training Activities
Larger enterprises answered that there was an improvement in their training activities. The same is true for foreign-owned. DIK's reported small changes, rather than an improvement (a negative coefficient for Answer 2 and a positive one for Answer 3). There was an improvement of training activities in the aggregates and ceramics industry. Investment funds made only small changes in their training activities. Employees (at a 0.16 significance level), state and domestic-owned enterprises, as well as enterprises of wooden and metal product industries, reduced their training activities. Twenty enterprises reported a reduction of the training activities. 
Change in the Production
The changes in production are shown in Table 10 . Production was changed remarkably in the chemical and fibre industries. Small changes are indicated by the following sectors: textile and clothing, wooden goods, pulp, paper and publishing, rubber and plastic materials, aggregates and ceramics, and metal products. Change in the basic phase of production 48 202
Change in the Production Programme
The innovation activities vary according to the owner: a drastic change in the production program of enterprises belonging to employees (usually in cooperatives, whose production included 35 % of completely new products) and domestic owners (33% completely new products) can be registered, in contrast to the enterprises of state, investment funds and DIK's, which innovated less intensively, as is shown in Table 14 . Foreign owners, others and managers innovate products by 32, 33 and 30 %, respectively. The state, DIK's and investment funds kept the majority of their products unchanged (62, 58 and 57% respectively of the existing products in Table 11 , last column). Enterprises predominantly owned by managers, foreign investors together with domestic investors, and employees (mainly cooperatives) changed the production program more radically during 1991-1993 in compared to the state-owned enterprises and the enterprises owned by individual investors and investment funds from coupon privatization. The former group of owners innovated to higher extent the existing products or started to produce completely new products, compared to the latter.
Performance of Private and State Enterprises
Without distinguishing between private and state enterprises, we can illustrate the general tendencies of the restructuring processes using the data on the performance of the firms during 1991-1993. In Table 12 we present a summary of the basic accountancy data for firms participating in the survey. The average size of enterprises according to the number of employees decreased between 1991 and 1993 by one quarter. Nevertheless, the share of workers did not change markedly in the same period of time, and was 72% in 1991 and 74% in 1993. The debt/equity ratio increased from 31% in 1991 to 34% in 1993. While the credit burden increased, average profitability decreased radically from 21 9% in 1991 to 3.8% in 1993. The share of exported goods on outputs almost doubled. 
Private versus State Enterprises
Turning to the performance differences between the state-owned and private firms, we analyze the changes in number of employees, sales, average wage, share of exported goods, and relative indicators of performance such as profit per sales, inventories per sales, credits per sales investment per sales and debt/equity ratio in firms from 1991 and 1993. From Table 13 we can conclude that private firms were performing better than the state-owned enterprises. Private enterprises have a higher productivity and profitability, they have, on average lower inventories but a higher credit burden which increases in time.
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One of the reasons can be a more intensive investment activity in the private firms, which is related to more intensive restructuring (see further).
Private firms are, on average smaller than the state ones. This is the result of the continuing process of breaking up of enterprises during privatization and is also due to the fact that newly established firms are prevalently of small and medium size.
Standard Methods versus Non-standard Methods of Privatization
Since the Czech Republic is far ahead with its privatization, we are interested in the impact of particular privatization methods on the behaviour of firms.
Thanks to previous factorization, we are now left with a relatively small number of variables, and we can apply standard correlation analysis (Table A7 in Appendix 2). The correlation analysis suggests that firms privatized through voucher privatization can be characterized by the following: -will invest in machinery, and will have mass production; -did not use credits, did not innovate, and were not internally stable; -their main barrier is low demand, not taxes and interest; -fired employees, decreased sales, had low labor input and high wages; -were under competitive pressure, firms privatized by restitution:
-used credits and innovated; -considered their main barrier to be demand, not taxes and interests; -hired employees and increased sales; -will not expand, but will keep the same position, transformed cooperatives:
-were labor-intensive with low wages; -did not make organizational changes; -believe their barriers are low demand, employees and legislation, not taxes and interest, firms privatized by sales (auctions and direct sales) to domestic investors:
-changed organization; -will invest in machinery and will have mass production;
It was interesting to learn whether there exist differences in restructuring between enterprises privatized through the coupon method and standard methods of privatization. The following The analysis confirms our previous finding that firms privatized through coupon method are less innovative. In addition, it can be concluded that they also pay more attention to questions concerning quality, and that they are less productive than the firms privatized through sale.
New Start-ups versus Incumbent Firms
About 15% from the total sample are new start-ups; these firms have all been established in the sector of machinery, metal and plastic products. The group of newly-established firms invests more than the old firms and has increased the number of employees as well as sales. The new start-ups have a productivity three times higher than that of the incumbent firms; they are also more productive and are growing faster in comparison to incumbent firms. These firms have more stable management, give more attention to the quality of products and innovate more (34% new products in comparison with 19.8% in incumbent).
New firms have more problems with the acquisition of credits; they nevertheless have higher expectations for the future (71% compared with the incumbent firms' 31%). These start-ups not only have a higher labor productivity; their sales grow rapidly, too. Their characteristics indicate internal stability and excellent perspectives. 
Restructuring -Construction of the Complex Variable.

Unweighted Measure of Restructuring
Since we have several answers about the firms' activities contributing to what we understand as restructuring, we utilize these for the measurement and constructed complex measure of restructuring.
The six considered attributes of the firms restructuring efforts during last three years are: changes in management, changes in the organization structure, change in production, the intensification of quality control, the intensification of training activities and the innovation of the majority of products.
If for at least five of the above attributes the answer was positive, we consider the intensity of restructuring as "very high restructuring." In the case of four positive answers we use the expression "high restructuring." Three positive answers indicate "low restructuring," and below three "very low restructuring." The intervals are chosen in order to have a similar number of firms in each group.
We aimed at shedding more light on the following question: Do the private enterprises restructure more than those owned and administered by the state? Results are summarized in 
A Weighted Measure of Restructuring
Looking at the results of the previous section, the reader can argue that not all the attributes of restructuring are of the same importance. For instance, the training activities are probably rather less important than product innovations or changes in quality. Thus, we redefine restructuring according to some other attributes (now we use even more attributes), and we rank them according to the importance we think they have. From now on, we will understand restructuring as:
-first: implementation of new products, intensification of quality control and improvement in marketing; -second: division or merger of the firm, new internal organizational structure, partial innovations and rapid change in the number of employees (the size of the firm); -third: organizational improvements in the production process, changes in the basic phase of production, intensification of training and changes in management.
Additionally, we define the attributes of no restructuring:
-first: the firm has not changed its organizational structure, and it did not improve the organization of the production process, it did not improve its marketing, and it did not make changes in the basic phase of production; -second: the firm decreased quality control; -third: the firm reduced training activities.
For analytical purposes, we apply the score model to the above definition. Each attribute contributes to the artificially created variable RES (= the degree of restructuring) with a specific amount of points: 10 points for the 1st attributes, 6.6 points for the second and 3.3 points for the 3rd. Similarly, the first attributes of no restructuring represent -10 points, the second -6.6 points, and the third -3.3 points. Thus the theoretically achievable minimum is -19.9 points and the theoretical maximum is 63 points. The applied computational algorithm is presented in Appendix 2.
Since we constructed a new artificial variable which serves as the basis for the subsequent analysis, we should check its applicability. Note that we have not included any attribute of financial restructuring. Nevertheless, restructuring in our sense controls for the main activities to be undertaken in the transformation of firm operating in the command economy into the market-oriented firm.
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Every standard economic analysis starts with a descriptive analysis. This step is even more important since we are not sure if the dependent variable in the analysis (RES) has desirable properties.
On the basis of the interquartile range, four outliers with a low degree of restructuring were identified and none extreme. 10 The quartiles are presented in the boxplot (Figure 1 ). Looking carefully at these four outliers, we found that their major characteristic is (aside from those contributing by definition to a low value of RES) a very low level of investment. Three of these outliers are waiting for privatization and one is a recently established foreign firm. Three outliers export the majority of the production. Surprisingly, all of them are very optimistic about the future. In fact, we have not found any good common reason for their low degree of restructuring except a slightly lower competitive pressure than on average. They are probably outliers in the standard sense, and we omit them from further analysis.
Figure 1: Boxplot of the degree of restructuring (RES).
Although the highest values of RES were not identified as outliers, we examined the firms with the top five degrees of restructuring, all of which were already privatized. Privatization led to one strong owner -either a foreign owner or a direct domestic one. They rapidly increased exports, especially to the West, and they intend to be export-oriented. All of them feel the rapid increase in competition. Their investment was financed by credits and by raising the equity. All the five firms show signs of progressive management with good future perspectives. Looking at the firms with the highest values of RES fully supports the proper construction of our measure of restructuring.
The other desirable property of RES should be its fairly even distribution around the firms. Ideally, this would be a normal distribution, which provides the best properties for a relative comparative analysis. The standard tool for presenting the distribution is the histogram. Figure 2 shows the histogram of RES for the sample without outliers. It is accompanied by the basic distributional statistics. Considering Figure 2 and all the above findings, we conclude that our artificially created measure of the degree of restructuring is good enough to be used in our later analysis.
Figure 2: Histogram and distributional statistics of the degree of restructuring (RES)
Now we use RES to analyze the dependence of restructuring on three sets of characteristics: the firm's size, the dominant owner and the industry. There are several measures for the size of a firm. The most common are sales, the number of employees and the equity. Equity cannot apply to the Czech Republic because newly-established firms do not have strong enough incentives to raise it. It is quite common that fast-growing new firms with tens of millions of sales and hundreds of employees keep their declared equity at the initial level (usually below half a million crowns). We decided to take the sales in 1993 as the measure of the firm's size.
For analyzing the impact of ownership we again apply the definition from chapter 2.2. (a dominant owner is defined as owning more than 50% of the firm).
The additional explanatory variables are fifteen dummies for industries. Altogether, we analyze the impact of twenty-four variables on RES. With the exception of sales, they are dummy variables.
Searching for linear interdependence, we undertake the correlation analysis. No extremely strong correlations between explanatory variables exist. The strongest dependence exists between the size of the firm and the industry "means of transport" (the correlation coefficient is 0.32). Thus, there are no serious problems with multicollinearity for the later regression analysis.
Surprisingly, only two explanatory variables are marked as significantly correlated with the degree of restructuring. They are the dummies for the foreign majority owner and the direct domestic majority owner. The linear dependence between the size of the firm and RES is below 10%. But it would be wrong to conclude that the size affects the degree of restructuring very little. We only know that the dependence is low when it is assumed to be linear.
A corollary of the analysis is regressions. We first regress the RES on a whole set of explanatory variables, checking for the nonlinear influence of size. The simplest way of allowing for an unknown nonlinear functional form is to use a polynomial function. Most functions can be approximated by a polynomial function with sufficient accuracy. Since we do not predict that the appropriate functional form of the influence of the size of the firm is too wild (too many peaks), we use a polynomial expression in the third degree (sales in 1993 to the powers one, two and three).
Since the majority of variables do not significantly contribute to explaining the degree of restructuring, we increased the number of degrees of freedom by omitting some of them. In the following regression, we employ only variables with higher correlation coefficients (with respect to RES) and with higher tstatistic values. The remaining seven explanatory variables are the size (SALES) and the dummies for the foreign major owner (FORIN), direct domestic major owner (DOMIN), state as the major owner (STATE), the non-identified major owner (OTHER), the wooden goods industry (WOOD) and pulp, the paper and publishing industry (PAPER). The results of the regression are summarized in Table 17 . Although the explanatory power of the regression is not very high (the adjusted R-squared is 0.11), we are able to draw some conclusions. 11 The extremely high t-statistic for the constant suggests a concentration around the overall degree of restructuring. Note that the value of the constant is very close to the mean and the median of the distribution of RES. The size, after applying the nonlinear form, is now one of the most determining variables. Concerning the rest of the explanatory variables, the strong, positive impact of domestic and foreign owners in restructuring should be stressed. Firms still owned by the state restructured less than others.
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11 There are well known arguments against mechanical evaluation of goodness of fit on the basis of R 2 , without testing for omitted variables, wrong functional form, etc. As Kenedy (92) says "A high R 2 is not necessary for "good" estimates; R 2 could be low because of a high variance of the disturbance terms".
Since RES is a relative measure, the estimated value of the positive impact of the private owner (about 6 points for DOMIN and FORIN) does not impart much information. Therefore, we added the estimated coefficients to the median separately for STATE, DOMIN and FORIN. Then we found the corresponding position in the distribution of RES.
For the median, it holds that 50% of the firms restructured more and the same proportion restructured less. Where the state was the major owner, 66% of the firms restructured more. When the majority owner is a direct domestic or foreign one, there are only 30% of firms which restructured more. Since the tstatistics for all three dummies (STATE, DOMIN, FORIN) are highly significant, and the shift of the firm's position in the distribution of RES is substantial, we proved a distinct effect of ownership on restructuring.
Despite the extremely high significance of the constant and the acceptable significance of some ownership dummies, we have not found any notable effect of the industry on restructuring. Because of the introduction of size through the polynomial expression of the third degree, we cannot say that small firms restructure more or less than large ones do.
An alternative interpretation of the regression results is possible. Once we assume that we have not omitted any relevant explanatory variables, that we chose the appropriate functional form and that our regression satisfies all other standard assumptions, the dominant role of the constant then implies that the degree of restructuring does not depend crucially on the characteristics of firms.
Conclusions
The general progress in restructuring is high between 1991 and 1993. We can conclude that, compared with state enterprises, private enterprise restructure more, especially if they have a clearly defined and concentrated ownership. Private enterprises have a higher productivity and profitability; they have on average lower inventories, but a higher credit burden which increases with time. A more intensive investment activity of private firms suggests more intensive restructuring. Additionally, the analysis shows that, among the private firms, those privatized by the coupon method are less innovative and pay less attention to quality.
Focusing on the differences between industries, we obtained reached the following results:
The market share decreased significantly for enterprises in wooden goods, 32 decreased for those in textiles and clothing, metal products, and machinery and instruments. An increase in market share of firms was recorded in pulp, paper and publishing, and means of transport, and a significant increase in food and beverages, and rubber and plastic materials.
Concerning the effect of size, larger enterprises were more likely to improve training activities and replace mangers. They are more exportoriented and one of their main barriers is the foreign trade restrictions.
This work can be used as a starting point for more detailed analysis of particular aspects of restructuring and for testing theoretical models and hypotheses. Furthermore, some issues such as competition and barriers to growth and entry may be included to broaden the analysis.
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APPENDIX 1 -Questionnaire Figure A1 shows a very strong relationship between answers: no change of market share and no competition pressure. All the other answers are rather less interdependent (the rescaled distance is rather higher when they merge).
APPENDIX 2 -Factor and cluster analyses
On the right hand side of the dendrogram we see what the appropriate number of representative variables is. On the rescaled distance of about 20 there are six clusters, on about 21 five clusters, on about 22 four clusters and on about 23 two clusters. Merging directly from four to two clusters can be interpreted as the fact that the same information is held by three clusters as by two clusters. Therefore, extracting three representative variables instead of two is pointless.
The largest jump in distances occurs in the case of two clusters (from 23 to 25). We extract, by the method of principal components, two, four and five factors (but not three). Both four and five factors are difficult to interpret, so we are left with the case of two factors (Table A1 ). The first factor is based on two variables: an increase in competition and not huge rise of competition. It is natural to call it "increase in competition, but not huge." The three variables that contribute most to the third factor are: no change in competition, no competition at all and no decrease in market share. We abbreviate it as "no competition". The dendrogram ( Figure A2 ) shows a strong relationship between restitution and the share of restituents in the firm's property, other (unlisted) method of privatization and employee ownership, and voucher privatization and share of privatization funds and individual voucher investors in the firm's property respectively. The appropriate number of representative variables is either 2, 5 or 7, but surely not 3, 4 or 6. Extraction of only two factors would lead to oversimplification, while seven factors for seven alternative methods (we asked only about seven methods of privatization in our questionnaire) would not lead to any simplification of the analysis. So, we extracted 5 factors (Table A2 ).
The first factor clearly represents "voucher privatization." The variables contributing most are voucher privatization as the method, and privatization funds and individual voucher investors as owners. The second factor stands for "restitution". The third one is based on other (unlisted) privatization methods and employee ownership. The privatization method belonging here is mostly transformation of cooperatives. A minor part is represented by free transfers to central restitution fund, etc.. This factor we call "cooperative transformation". The fourth factor represents "new private firms" recently established. It is formed from the answer: newly established firm, which is an alternative option to the privatization method. All newly established firms in our sample are private. The second most important variable is the proportion of state ownership. This variable contributes with a negative sign to the factor formation, therefor the interpretation is: no (or extremely low) state ownership in the firm. The last factor stands for "sale to domestic owner". The variables most contributing are direct domestic ownership, and the methods of privatization are auctions and direct sales. The cluster analysis for the firm's past internal development results in the choice of either 4 or 5 representative variables. The factor analysis fails for 5 factors, but it is quite good in the case of 4 factors, which we call "human resources development", "organizational change", "credit financed innovation" and "internal stability." The factorization of the main past barriers is the best in the case of 3 factors, where the first one combines "competition, uncertainty, know-how", the second is "demand, no taxes, no interests", and the third is "employees, legislation." See table A4, overleaf. It is obvious that sales play a unique role in the group of answers about economic indicators, because they are used to normalize other variables. In such a case, it is useful to exclude sales from the rest the of economic indicators and use sales separately. The most appropriate number of representative variables for the rest of the economic indicators is 4, with the following meanings: "increase in size", "large labor input, low wage", "large capital input, low profitability", and "change in exports and profits". Firm merged with other firm 6.6
There was a significant change in the organizational structure of the firm 6.6
Percentage share of innovated products on output 0.066 * the num.
Organization of production was improved 3.3
Changes in the basic phase of production 3.3
Intensity and quality of training increased rapidly 3.3
Managers were completely replaced 3.3
Majority of managers was replaced 2.2
Intensity and quality of training increased slightly 1.65
Some managers were replaced 1.1
Training activities were reduced -3.3
Quality control was not intensified -6.6
There were no changes in organization structure and production and marketing -10
Note: the considered time horizon is the last three years.
At the end we added the points for the effect of change in the number of employees. First we computed the change as CHANGE = 1 -MIN(employees in 1991, employees in 1993)/MAX(employees in 1991, employees in 1993). For better understanding we list some values of it: CHANGE = 0 for the same number of employees in 1991 and 1993, CHANGE = 0.5 for doubling or reducing to one half of the number of employees, CHANGE = 0.9 for ten times increase or ten times decrease of the number of employees.
Since it is rather more important to double or reduce to one half the number of employees for large firms than for small ones, we reflect this by computing the points as: CHANGE * COEFFICIENT, where COEFFICIENT is 3.3 for firms with up to 25 employees, 4.4 up to 100 employees, 5.5 up to 1000 employees and 6.6 for larger.
